Rearranging the Debt Chairs

Rearranging the Debt Chairs

A simmering tension between monetary and fiscal policy is emerging as a key issue to watch for financial investors.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent made waves with his recent announcement that the Treasury would at least double the size of its buybacks of long-term debt in the coming months. He argues that long-term yields do not reflect fundamentals, suggesting that the Treasury's intervention is aimed to restore proper market functioning. This generated a lot of commentary, most of which missed the mark, in my view. Some have compared it to past Federal Reserve (Fed) interventions, debating whether it was more similar to quantitative easing or to “Operation Twist,” and suggesting that the Treasury is effectively taking over some of the Fed's functions.

This, as I said, misses the basic point: This kind of Treasury intervention is irrelevant unless the fiscal deficit is reduced. As long as the government continues to run a deficit which is exceptionally large by peacetime standards, the Treasury needs to issue more and more debt. These kinds of interventions are less like quantitative easing than like rearranging the chairs on the deck of… Well, no, let's not go that far. But markets can see that the government shows no inclination to reduce expenditures, and when you add the cost of the conflict with Iran and the tariffs refunds, we’re on track for another large deficit this year and an even larger one next year.

The situation is made even more vulnerable by the remarkably poor debt management of past years. The extended period of historically low interest rates after the global financial crisis and through the COVID-19 pandemic provided a golden opportunity to extend the maturity of outstanding debt, an opportunity that previous Treasury Secretaries inexplicably missed. We are now paying the consequences, with 67% of outstanding debt at a maturity of less than five years and 54% under three years.

Poor Debt Management (2023-2024) as the Treasury Borrowed Short While Yield Curve Was Inverted

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